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Polityka Historiczna: Debating Holocaust Remembrance in Poland
Connor Kridle

On February 6th, 2018 Polish President Andrzej Duda signed into law “the amendment to
The Act on the Institute of National Remembrance,” or as many in the Western media referred to
it, Poland’s “Holocaust law.”1 In brief, the text of the amendment made it illegal to “publicly and
contrary to the facts attribute[] to the Polish Nation or to the Polish State responsibility or coresponsibility for the Nazi crimes committed by the German Third Reich,” and the legislation
was made “applicable to a Polish citizen as well as a foreigner.”2 This act and the legislative
events leading up to it ignited almost immediate and widespread controversy, with many worried
about the effects such a law could have on free speech,3 broader historical interpretation,4 and
appearances of antisemitism.5
To many people outside Poland, the passage of this law seemed like an aberration, a
power grab by Polish nationalists in the government to try and change how the past is to be
remembered, researched, and articulated both within and beyond Polish borders. The amendment
to “the Act,” however, is no aberration. This amendment should be understood in the broader
context of post-communist Polish struggles to define “Polishness,” and its struggle to incorporate
the Holocaust into this definition and history. In this context, the amendment serves both a
political and practical purpose. For the far-right Polish nationalists, for whom this project has
been long in the making, the act both sanitizes what it means to be Polish and stifles examination
of this ever-solidifying narrative. However, as many on the far-right in Poland see this
amendment as a way of limiting debate on the past, others see power in questions, in dialogue,
and in the inherent complexity of history.
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The idea of national remembrance is deceptively simple. To many in the United States or
other western countries, such an idea is so commonplace that its myths and performances have
gone largely unnoticed. But to the post-communist bloc and nations where the events of the
Holocaust occurred, national remembrance was, and may continue to be, a fraught and complex
issue in which members of political and cultural communities struggle with what it means for a
nation to remember. For a nation to remember also brings forth the dilemma of who is to be
considered as a member of that nation, a topic that itself opens up complicated and often dark
reflections.
To understand the uniqueness and the subtle yet enigmatic nature of national
remembrance, a theoretical framing is necessary. If the early to mid-twentieth century was the
age of ideology, then the late twentieth and early twenty-first seem to be times of historical
evaluation and revision. Nikolay Koposov’s brilliant work Memory Laws, Memory Wars
chronicles the rise of memory as a subject, and the intersection of memory, identity, and
juridification in late twentieth century Europe.6 As Koposov highlights, “[b]efore the 1980s, the
concept of memory, and of historical memory in particular, was only occasionally used,” in
academic work.7 Ideas and conceptions of “identity,” as a sense of personhood, “came to
prominence only with the emergence of interest in memory;” and it is these ideas of memory,
“both individual and collective,” that can be viewed as “custodians of identity.”8 This connection
between memory and identity is central to the formation of national narratives and identities used
to unite nations in the aftermath of the Second World War and the fall of the Soviet Bloc.
Poland provides a vivid example of this interaction, and the recent amendment is another
iteration in this long and complicated process, one with threads of political nationalism and
historical skepticism. To understand the interaction of memory and law that takes place in the
amendment, it is important to understand the mechanisms of memory laws as a category, their
idealized function, and the context in which they arise.9 Memory laws are a fairly recent
phenomenon that have arisen in specific political contexts in which they act as logical and
necessary means to political ends. Places like Spain, the U.S., England, and especially France
and Germany have utilized legal mechanisms common in their democratic nations to outline
unacceptable understandings of the past.10 These laws exclusively “prohibit ‘incorrect’
interpretations of concrete historical events,” demonstrating that “in the age of memory, Western
historical consciousness has become centered not on ‘master narratives’ but on the fragments of
the past that symbolically represent national communities.”11 Nations often choose to juridify
remembrance of traumas and tragedies especially, which brings up the dilemma of who to
include as a member of the victim nation.12 Victimhood in this narrow sense relates to the way
in which nations established after the Second World War or the fall of the USSR formed
identities around the struggles of the political community toward independence, primarily from
ideological enemies like fascism or communism. Nations like Poland formed national narratives
6

Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 11.
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Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 11-12.
9
Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars.
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Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 8-11.
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that encapsulated the destruction of their previous way of life at the hands of both Nazi and
Soviet forces. The definitions of “Pole” and the stories to be recounted almost mythically
encapsulate only a margin of the history. This process has not ceased as evidenced by the
passage of the amendment.
The original law to which the amendment is directed is the 1998 Act on The Institute of
National Remembrance, a law which sought to memorialize “the enormity of the number of
victims [and] the losses and damages suffered by the Polish people during World War II and
after it ended.”13 This 1998 law was expansive, with effects that encompassed nearly all public
aspects of remembrance in Poland. It established institutes of remembrance, sought to reform
education of the past, and included penal provisions that criminalized denial of the crimes
“perpetrated on persons of Polish nationality or Polish citizens of other nationalities between
September 1, 1939 until July 31, 1990.”14 The act created a body, known as the “Instytut Pamięci
Narodowej” or IPN (which translates as the Institute of National Remembrance), whose primary
function at the time was to gain access to the newly opened communist archives. The IPN also
sought to make the documents concerning citizens’ lives under communism public, investigate
and prosecute past crimes committed “on persons of Polish nationality or Polish citizens of other
nationalities,” and fine or imprison “[a]nyone who publicly and contrary to the facts denie[d]
[the] crimes” listed above.15
This original act did not explicitly mention the events of the Holocaust, but within its
investigative purview it listed the ability to prosecute “crimes against humanity,” and the denial
of such crimes.16 The act defines these crimes specifically as “crimes of genocide as understood
by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on
December 9, 1948 [...] as well as other serious persecutions based on the ethnicity of the people
and their political, social, racial or religious affiliations.”17 This provision was not full of empty
words and it was used in the prosecution and conviction of former Opole University History
professor Dariusz Ratajczak, a Holocaust denier.18 The fact that the law was enforced at all, and
specifically enforced in a way that comprehended memory of the Holocaust as worthy of
protection, highlights that remembrance of the Holocaust, at least in a broad idea of the
Holocaust, was understood as an aspect of Polish history worth outlining in law. The fact that a
Polish citizen was prosecuted explicitly for Holocaust denial shows the breadth of the original
law and the understanding that the Holocaust was to be a part of Polish memory.
This original act can itself be considered a memorialization of the past: a way for the
Polish government to form a national understanding of past events by publicly acknowledging
their occurrence and by utilizing the power of the state to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for such acts or their denial. The exact understanding of the Holocaust that the State
purports is a bit vague. This vagueness stems from who the state views as the perpetrators of
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance,” Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, https://www.legaltools.org/doc/fc69d7/pdf/.
14
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
15
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
16
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
17
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
18
Maciej T. Nowak, “Guilty of Holocaust Denial. Negligible public harm?,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 December 2001,
http://auschwitz.org/en/museum/news/guilty-of-holocaust-denial-negligible-public-harm,227.html.
13
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these “crimes of genocide.”19 In the text of the act, as well as how it was implemented, the
perpetrators are explicitly and singularly “the occupiers, the [sic] Nazism, and communism.”20
Under the scope of this original act, the historical enemies of “persons of Polish nationality or
Polish citizens of other nationalities,” and the parties responsible for tragic historical events are
the Nazi and communist “occupiers.”21 The act thus functioned politically by creating a narrative
of the past that fit the unique identity of Poland’s post-communist republic. This was an identity
that saw the past as one of occupation. Poles, as explicitly stated in the act, were heroes fighting
“for the sake of the independence of the Polish State,” and even more so they were fighting “in
defence of freedom and human dignity” for all people.22 Thus, the prosecution of Holocaust
denial was not one reinforcing the breadth of Holocaust memory, but instead aimed to reinforce
the understanding that the Holocaust was not just a tragedy to be remembered, but a tragedy to
be remembered as having distinctively Nazi origins.
This narrative fit the political environment of its formation well. In the mid to late 1990s
when this movement arose, Poland was free from communism but fragile and trying to find its
way in a new geopolitical world dominated by the West. This narrative and its mechanisms
accomplished dual objectives. By acknowledging the brutality of the Holocaust, its geographical
centrality on Polish soil, and by prosecuting those who denied the Holocaust itself, Poland
looked–in form if not in substance–similar to other Western European nations where such
legislation was common. The specific treatment given to the idea of perpetration in Nazi crimes,
though, allowed this new Polish republic to unify under an altered narrative of the past. This
narrative allowed members of this new Polish nation to be treated as heroes and as victims in the
fight for their own independence and the broader struggle for Western virtues of human dignity
and freedom. The explicit language of the act and its implementation formulated a historical
narrative in which the Holocaust existed, but as a grand plan instituted by Nazi occupiers on a
populace that was trying to expel these very same “occupiers.”23
This homogenized view of the past was crystallized further in response to new political
dilemmas in the recent amendment passed by Polish legislators in 2018. This new amendment
functions primarily by making what was largely implicit in the original act explicit. The
amendment now adds, “Ukrainian nationalists and members of Ukrainian formations
collaborating with the German Third Reich,”24 as perpetrators of crimes against Poles rather than
referring to those groups under the blanket term “occupiers” as in the previous law.25 The
amendment also inserts a new section entitled: “Protection of the reputation of the Republic of
Poland and the Polish Nation,” under which the IPN is explicitly empowered to broaden its
purview from the narrow aim of the original legislation. The IPN is now mandated to focus its
attention and resources on those that “attribute[] to the Polish Nation or to the Polish State
responsibility or co-responsibility for the Nazi crimes committed by the German Third Reich [...]
or for any other offences constituting crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes, or otherwise

“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
21
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
22
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
23
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
24
“Act of 26 January 2018.”
25
“The Act on The Institute of National Remembrance.”
19
20
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[that] grossly diminishes the responsibility of the actual perpetrators of these crimes.”26 In
essence, this textual maneuvering further expands the list of “occupiers” to include Ukrainian
collaborators, while simultaneously failing to include historical examples of Polish collaboration.
Nowhere in the document is this idea of Polish collaboration even contemplated. In fact, with the
2018 amendment to the original law, the idea of Polish collaboration is now expressly prohibited.
This recent textual addition shows the understanding that the Nazis obviously did not act alone,
but it disallows attribution of collaboration to Poles in any manner.
This latest amendment is more than pure memorialization; it goes further, seeking to
prosecute the act of historical work itself. It seems that this nuance was at least considered by the
authors of the amendment because it is explicitly noted that “[a]n offence is not committed if the
perpetrator [...] acted within the framework of artistic or scientific activity.”27 This distinction is
not present in the original amendment and thus seems to uncover the motives behind the latest
amendment. The original law, having no clause exempting historical or scientific work,
implicitly understands the factual underpinnings of research into the Holocaust and war crimes in
the Second World War. The new amendment though, with its distinction against prosecuting
researchers and artists, seems to be acknowledging the presence of a valid historical debate on
Polish actions during the Holocaust as well as a valid fear of silencing this debate.
The inclusion of researchers and artists as some sort of exempted class with respect to the
penal provisions of the new amendment highlight some of the confusing aspects of the
amendment itself, as well as how such a provision is to even be enforced. This phrase also brings
forth questions, such as: Who is to enforce such a provision and thus determine the bounds of
scientific and artistic activities? What are these activities and what are not? This vagueness
empowers the state to make case-by-case determinations as to who is and is not to be considered
a valid researcher or artist. By implementing a vague and sweeping law, the Polish state can now
act as arbiter over its history in a way that could certainly stifle speech about and investigation
into the past.
It is not surprising given the expansiveness of such a law and given the distinct political
context of Poland vis-a-vis other nations, that its passage has resulted in controversy both at
home and abroad. Journalists abroad largely see the moves as politically motivated, fearing what
the restriction of speech about, and research into, the Holocaust could precipitate in Poland or
what this move could inspire similar governments to pursue. Politicians in the United States,
Israel, and Germany have condemned the passage of the amendment and have highlighted
troubles they have with its implementation and the underlying political motivations behind it.
Within Poland, the opinions are complicated. Some on the political right see this as a watershed
moment of Polish sovereignty in which Poland will not be guided by outside influences but
rather by “our own decisions and the interests of our country,” as Polish Minister of the Interior
Joachim Brudzińsk put it.28 Others see it as popularizing debate and discussion about the past

“Act of 26 January 2018.”
“Act of 26 January 2018.”
28
“‘Poland guided by national interest’ says official after US senators slam restitution bill,” Radio Poland, 28 March
2018, http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/356172,Poland-guided-by-national-interest-says-official-after-USsenators-slam-restitution-bill.
26
27

Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018

5

Voces Novae, Vol. 10 [2018], Art. 7

and as a means to give media attention to historical groups- and thus empower a
countermovement against the motives behind the amendment.29
To understand why the Holocaust is such a difficult and frayed issue in Polish politics it
is important to better situate it within Poland’s complex past. The geographic centrality of
Poland, with its borders acting as the separation between “the East” and “the West,” has played a
powerful role in the shaping of its culture and its history. Prior to the the First World War and
especially before the Second, Polish society was one that included a relative amount of openness
and tolerance among what were very diverse groups.30 Much of this cultural climate stemmed
from the multi-ethnic makeup of modern Poland in which different ethnic groups, including a
large population of Jews, called Poland home.31 This Poland was destroyed by Nazi Germany in
1939, with the multi-ethnic society and the political characteristics underlying it exterminated in
order to create a hierarchical Nazi ethnostate.
Poland’s history during the period of the Second World War is especially complicated.
The broad governing authority and most institutional infrastructure was destroyed not long after
German invasion in September 1939. When the German military took hold of the country,
specific groups of Nazi soldiers (the Einsatzgruppen, essentially mobile killing units) engaged in
targeted murders of the intelligentsia, religious authority, and other politically situated groups in
order to instill disorganization and quell possible uprisings.32 This was not just another act of
war, but how the Nazi military began dismantling the country and destroying most common
ways for Poles to operate cohesively and in large, organize groups. It is also important to
recognize that the Nazis chose specific groups of Poles as the first to be murdered, noting a
hierarchy of influence still relevant in Poland today. These actions, along with the subsequent
Soviet invasion of Poland, reduced the country essentially to its geographic elements and the
relative strategic importance it could play in the War. Nazi forces pushed further east and
eventually took control of all nominal Polish territory, expanding the subjects and land that fell
under the established governing arm, the General Government.33 At this point in Polish history,
the term “Poland” carried little to no political import, as the Polish government only functioned
in exile and the only Poles with political influence left within the former borders were now
partisans, imprisoned, or perpetrators all lacking consistent goals and means.34
That there was no functioning Polish state does not mean that Poles were exclusively
victims of Nazi and Soviet barbarity. Polish collaboration is well documented.35 In many
instances, Poles needed varying degrees of motivation by Nazi authorities to turn on their
neighbors,36 take ownership of property that did not belong to them,37 and also kill Jews
29

Forum for Dialogue, e-mail message to supporters, 23 February 2018.
Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland Volume II 1795 to the Present (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005), 291-322.
31
Davies, God’s Playground, 176-195.
32
David M. Crowe, The Holocaust: Roots, History, and Aftermath (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008).
33
Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945: The Years of Extermination (New York: HarperCollins,
2007), 30-37.
34
Davies, God’s Playground, 323-366.
35
Jan Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001); and Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945; among others.
36
Gross, Neighbors; and Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945; among others.
37
Gross, Neighbors; and Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945; among others.
30

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol10/iss1/7

6

Kridle: Polityka Historiczna

themselves.38 As the book Neighbors by Jan Gross documents vividly, the murderers of Jews in
Poland were exclusively the Nazi invaders, and in many instances could have been neighbors
who had lived next door or in the same community for generations.39 The village that Gross
describes in such harrowing detail, Jedwabne, was the site of violence not wholly unique in
Polish history.40
The events of the massacre took place over the course of a few days in July 1941 when
around 2,200 Poles (of whom somewhere around 1,500 were Jewish) inhabited Jedwabne.41
Included in these events, Polish Jews were forced into the town square where they were ordered
to pick grass while enduring rounds of beatings by a group of Polish men.42 The Jews of
Jedwabne were also ordered to dismantle the statue of Lenin that had been erected by the
previously occupying Soviet forces, and then were marched in two separate groups to a barn.43
The first group of Polish Jews were shot and buried within the barn and the second, much larger
group was locked inside as the barn was set ablaze.44 The Jedwabne massacre cuts to the heart of
the issue surrounding Polish complicity. Upon release in Poland, Gross’s book ignited debates
about its truthfulness and the extent to which Poles could have actually done such a thing. This
revival of the memory of Jedwabne highlight the fraught way that the events of the Holocaust fit
within Polish identity and national history.
Polish identity from this time, however, is not encapsulated solely by those who chose to
be perpetrators. Poles were also among those who chose to risk everything to save friends,45
neighbors,46 and even strangers.47 In fact Poland is home to highest number of the Righteous
Among the Nations48 of any country.49 Over 6,700 Poles risked all that they had, including their
own lives, in order to help Jews escape or hide during Nazi occupation of the country.50 Poles
were also themselves victims of Nazi brutality. Approximately 1.9 million non-Jewish Poles

38

Gross, Neighbors; and Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945; among others.
Gross, Neighbors.
40
Other notable examples include the Tykocin pogrom of 1941 and the Kielce pogrom of 1946.
41
Gross, Neighbors, 1-7.
42
Gross, Neighbors, 56-65.
43
Jan Gross, Neighbors, 60-61.
44
Jan Gross, Neighbors, 61.
45
Janina Tarnowski, Astoria, New York, 12 November 2000, interview 51366, USC Shoah Foundation for Visual
History and Education, University of Southern California, accessed 15 April 2018.
46
Jack Pariser, Laguna Beach, California, 4 December 1995, interview 9514, USC Shoah Foundation Institute for
Visual History and Education, University of Southern California, accessed 15 April 2018.
47
Rose Curczinski, San Francisco, 31 August 1997, USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and
Education, University of Southern California, accessed 15 April 2018.
48
The Righteous Among the Nations are non-Jews who took on incredible risks in order to rescue or save Jews
during the Holocaust. These people, if caught, were often executed or sent to concentration or death camps. “About
the Righteous,” The Righteous Among the Nations, Yad Vashem, Accessed 10 March 2018,
https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/about-the-righteous.html.
49
“About the Righteous.”
50
“About the Righteous.” This number, while nominally large, does also represent the complexity of Polish identity
during the time. When calculated on a per-capita basis, the amount of Polish Righteous is actually quite low
compared to other nations. If it is assumed that Poland’s wartime population was near 24,00,000 as most estimates
have it, then 6,700 individuals is a pretty measly number (under 1%). Data from: Kazimierz Piesowicz,
“Demographic effects of World War II” [Demograficzne skutki II wojny swiatowej.] Studia Demograficzne, No.
1/87, (1987) 103-36 pp.
39
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were killed by Nazi forces and over one million were deported within German-occupied territory
and into forced labor.51
After the War, the project of creating a unifying political or ethnic conception of what it
meant to be Polish was left unaddressed by the Soviet government in control, which favored a
more ideological unification. In this context the historic losses faced by Polish Jews and gentiles
alike at the hands of both Nazi and Soviet forces were primarily glossed over. Instead of
allowing for a distinctly Polish understanding of the past, the post-war Soviet-backed
government quickly sought to devise memorializations of the war that emphasized the Soviet, or
ideologically communist, aspects of Polish experience during the harrowing times. With this
ideological framing, memorializations did not discuss Jewish death but instead opted for phrases
like the “International Memorial for Victims of Fascism,”52 and often referenced murdered Jews
as “innocent Soviet citizens.”53 The effects of this ideological vocabulary both helped shield
Polish complicity in murder and took away important markers of identity from the dead. By
referencing murderers as exclusively fascist and the murdered as exclusively communist citizens,
this era of memory stalled significant investigation into the past and forbid much uncovering of
the complexities surrounding true victimhood and complicity.
The long shadow that communism and the Polish communist governments had cast over
Polish memory work was nominally relinquished with the fall of communism in 1989. While the
years of communist rule froze much Polish examination of the past by allowing only a narrow
band of acceptable interpretations and narratives, its removal did not change much with regard to
the Holocaust. The immediate post-communist years were primarily focused on economic
expansion and the uncharted territory of independence. As the new republic found its footing, it
could more thoroughly examine its past and create new narratives fit for a new Poland.
The primary goals of the post-communist space revolved around reevaluating the status
of Soviet era monuments and Soviet-bent historical narratives that were commonplace and
visible throughout Poland. In practice this meant both a tearing down and building up of
memorializations. Monuments dedicated to prior Soviet leaders or to historical events with
primarily Soviet importance were removed and or replaced. Holidays themselves were even
changed, with the “National Holiday of Poland’s Rebirth” swapped for the proclamation of
Polish independence and the celebration of the first Polish constitution.54 Physical spots of
memory were also altered. Street and square names were changed, like the over 150 in Warsaw
alone, to fit the new narrative that those with political power in the post-communist nation
sought to devise.55 The primary shift of this narrative was to include the recently defunct Soviet-

“Polish Victims,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Accessed 20 March 2018,
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005473.
52
As the Soviet Auschwitz memorial was originally named in 1967. Pam R. Jenoff, "Managing Memory: The Legal
Status of Auschwitz-Birkenau and Resolution of Conflicts in The Post-Communist Era," The Polish Review 46, no.
2 (2001): 131-53.
53
As some memorials or post-war Soviet trials used. Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffery S. Gurock, The Holocaust in
the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-occupied Territories of the USSR,
1941-45, (London: Routledge Press, 2016).
54
Ewa Ochman, Post-Communist Poland: Contested Pasts and Future Identities, (New York: Routledge Press,
2014).
55
Ochman, Post-Communist Poland.
51
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backed government as an occupational force with ideological goals, similar to the earlier
classification of Nazi forces during the communist period.
As Poles began to articulate this new understanding of the past, the inevitability and
difficulty of facing the Holocaust became apparent. An early and representative flashpoint in this
struggle can be seen in the “crosses at Auschwitz” controversy, which heated up in the late 1980s
and early 1990s after Carmelite nuns opened a convent near Auschwitz I, and later erected a
cross on the grounds of Auschwitz II.56 This controversy brought in leaders from the Catholic
and Jewish faiths, who converged on Auschwitz and tried to explain the relative (and religious)
importance of the site to each faith. While the nuns were eventually forced to leave the grounds,
the controversy that the debates ignited indicated a new direction for Polish nationalism that
sought to more fully face the Holocaust, but in a distinctly Catholic and Polish manner.
Independence had allowed this new nationalism to form; a nationalism that incorporated
suffering and salvation in a complex religio-national manner. In this context the controversy was
more than religious. It signaled the centrality of Auschwitz to a Polish identity synonymous with
Catholic symbolism and thus imported on a historical site of the Holocaust, Catholic religious
ideation with Polish political goals. In bringing in Auschwitz these disparate elements of Polish
identity became fused. As the gates around Auschwitz were adorned with crosses and Polish
flags the connection of a new Polish republic, Catholicism, and trauma central to this new
nationalism became visible.
This budding nationalism sought to incorporate physical sites of tragedy in Poland’s past,
and thus necessarily had to include sites of the Holocaust. The manner in which these sites and
this history was included, however, served primarily political aims. To this new nationalism, the
Holocaust represented Polish suffering that, when combined with the emergence of the third
republic in 1990, could be cast as a tragic event leading to salvation through a new government
grounded in Catholicism.57 In order to accomplish this, Polish nationalists would need to claim
these historical sites of memory, and in some cases memory itself, as Polish in this distinctive
religio-political manner. It was similar to the Soviets in many ways because the sites or
memories were allowed to speak only in a vocabulary spoken and chosen by those in political
control. This meant reorienting these sites and their history away from places of Jewish murder
and toward Christian eschatological importance and Polish political reference. The crosses at
Auschwitz, therefore, were not to be interpreted exclusively as Christian symbols, but as Polish
ones- a unification of symbolism that Polish nationalists deemed correct and important.
This process of the formation of a comprehendible nationalism and Polish identity is
inherently political in nature. The broad political currents in Poland have followed a similar arc
to those in the rest of Europe proper, and have even at times resembled those of the United
States. Recently there has been a global rise of far-right parties and politicians set on national
sovereignty and grounded in exclusivist rhetoric, and Poland is no exception.
The government of Poland operates as a multiparty parliamentary system in which a
unitary executive (the President) is elected to a five-year term. Parliament includes the 460
member Sejm (lower house) who serve four year terms, and the 100 member Senat (upper house)
56
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who also serve four year terms. Since Poland’s first free (i.e. no direct communist influence)
parliamentary elections in 1991 and presidential elections in 1990, the country has gradually
shifted from far left and liberal parties to the center-right. During the majority of the 1990s and
into the early 2000s Polish politics was primarily a contest between left-leaning and liberal
parties and ideologies.58 The 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2001 parliamentary elections were all won
by more left-leaning or liberal political parties, and in each election these types of parties often
fought between each other, as the conservative parties were much less powerful, prominent, or
organized.59
The political tides shifted dramatically in the presidential election of 2005 and the
parliamentary elections of 2007. During this shift, the politics of Poland swung from primarily
left-leaning and open to the West and Europe to conservative, religious, and inwardly-focused. In
the presidential election of 2005, candidates from three right-wing and center-right parties (Law
and Justice, Civic Platform, and Self Defence of the Republic of Poland) garnered a massive
84.5% of the total votes cast.60 The most popular of the parties, the Law and Justice Party (or PiS
for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), should be considered a nationalist party (although its leaders deny
support for this nomenclature).61 The party’s past election programs have referenced broad
“historical experiences,” inherent “civilizational values,” and a distinctly Polish “lived fate” as
unifying conceptions of the Polish “nation.”62 The PiS considers this Polish nation to be “related
in an inextricable way with Christianity,” and it often uses quotes from the Polish Pope John
Paul II in a religio-political manner.63
Though they may sound like it, the PiS are not a fringe political group. Far from it, the
PiS is experiencing popularity at all-time highs64 due in large part to their expansive social
spending programs, popular euro-skeptic rhetoric, and firm Catholic cultural values.65 As such a
powerful and popular party, the PiS plays a central role in outlining and defining what it means
to be Polish. The rhetoric and the stances that the PiS takes on issues like immigration, church
and state relations, and social or welfare programs both reflects (to an extent) the will of the
party’s voters and the will of the Polish political elite in power.66
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When the PiS put forward the “Holocaust Law,” it did not do so as a last-ditch effort to
form a ruling majority with a fringe group or to win concessions from an extremist constituency.
Far from it, the PiS holds power tightly enough that it can pursue aims like the “Holocaust Law”
without much opposition. In this context, the Law is a single, albeit a concrete and legalistic,
manifestation of a broader political current that seeks to politicize history in furtherance of
nationalistic aims and the formation of a more novel Polish nationalism. In pursuing the law, the
PiS is using its control over the IPN (Institute of National Remembrance) to begin erasing debate
on issues like Jedwabne and to put an end to what some on the right call a “pedagogy of shame”
that seeks historical understandings of Polish complicity in the Holocaust.67 The exact
mechanisms at play involve power over funding and the ability to designate certain issues as
contrary to the interests of the Polish nation and thus outside the realm of acceptable inquiry.68 In
this environment, Polish nationalism is reaching back into the past in order to quiet debate and
cease investigation in the present. To those in power, multiple meanings and differences of
identity are unimportant to political unification and the glorification of a distinct idea of
Polishness is more politically relevant. With Poles portrayed as exclusively heroes and victims, it
does not help further political goals to engage in history that discusses perpetration, complicity,
or murder.
These actions and this emphasis by the PiS do not mean that history or memorialization
have ceased. Far from it, museums like the “Ulma Family Museum of Poles Saving Jews in
World War Two” and others like it69 have been recently opened, showing the consistent interest
in the past.70 But the aim of this museum and its particularly specific name serves purposes
beyond those purely historical. By emphasizing the heroism of some Poles, the museum tries to
metonymically include all Poles in such a category. Glorifying the heroes is admirable and there
is no wrong in such an action, but to the Polish government in power this is the only history that
should exist. Another recent example was the 2017 court battle over Poland’s newly established,
comprehensive Museum of the Second World War. Right before the grand opening, the PiS
government deemed the museum inadequately Polish and subsequently had it renovated and
merged with a smaller museum that focuses exclusively on Polish struggle during the War.71 The
government was not interested in a museum that highlighted the breadth of wartime experience
and instead favored one that furthered political renditions of history. These actions follow
broader acts of historical revisionism in the realm of teaching, where the PiS has fought to make
teaching history an “obligation to the nation” that furthers political goals above pedagogical
ones.72
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The Law should be understood in this political context. It is not a one-off act of
revisionism, but one tool among many that Polish nationalists have been using over much of the
post-communist years to try and formulate a national narrative that prioritizes Polish martyrdom
and sees Polish identity as exclusive and inapplicable to Poles of other ethnicities, especially
Jewish Poles. The Holocaust in this context remains largely taboo because of the difficult
questions that its events bring up regarding Polish complicity or perpetration. Polish nationalism
grounded in victimhood and martyrdom for Catholic or Western virtues becomes less convincing
and more complicated if Poles were murderers or Nazi collaborators themselves. By seeking to
teach history in a distinct way, augment museums toward a distinctly Polish reading of the past,
and to explicitly outlaw speech that runs counter to this broader narrative the PiS (and Polish
nationalists writ large) are trying to change historical understanding itself. By politicizing history
and engaging in Polityka Historyczna (the politics of history), Poland’s right-wing is melding the
past, as other regimes have before, and using the complexity of Polish history to further political
aims in the present.
The PiS, though popular and politically powerful, does not represent all Poles. Especially
with regard to the recent law, the government in power may speak loudest but does not represent
all voices within Poland on this issue especially. There are Polish groups like the Forum for
Dialogue who have partner programs with schools throughout the country to educate younger
Poles about the breadth of Jewish history in Poland including the events of the Holocaust.73
Though this law could be portrayed as a death knell for groups like the Forum, groups like these
view it as anything but. In fact, through the controversy stirred up by the political motivations
and vague language of the law, groups like the Forum are receiving widespread media attention
and a lively discussion has again awoken in Poland- seemingly contrary to the intentions of the
law. Polish support for the law is also far from unanimous, and it is unclear whether it will ever
be politically viable for the PiS to implement the law in a practical and meaningful way. 74 What
is clear, however, is that the law has not stifled debate nor has it silenced inquiry into the past. If
anything, the law may spur more questioning and more research into the topics that have brought
forth such a heated political battle. In that sense, there may be room for optimism, because even
though the existence of such a law is cause for concern, the backlash and counter-movement
against the spirit of the law have shown that the history of the Holocaust is still very much alive
in Poland, something that other western countries may not even be able to claim.75
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